Abstract-We establish a network formation game for the Internet's Autonomous System (AS) interconnection topology. The game includes different types of players, accounting for the heterogeneity of ASs in the Internet. We incorporate reliability considerations in the player's utility function, and analyze static properties of the game as well as its dynamic evolution. We provide dynamic analysis of topological quantities, and explain the prevalence of some "network motifs" in the Internet graph. We assess our predictions with real-world data.
and obtaining bounds on the "price of anarchy" and "price of stability". These metrics measure from above and below, correspondingly, the social cost deterioration at an equilibrium compared with a (socially) optimal solution. Alternatively, agent-based simulations are used in order to obtain statistical characteristics of the resulting topology [11] .
Nonetheless, the vast majority of these studies assume that the players are identical, whereas the Internet is a heterogeneous mixture of various entities, such as CDNs, minor ISPs, tier-1 ASs etc. There are only a few studies that have explicitly considered the effects of heterogeneity on the network structure. Some examples include [10] , which extends a previous model of formation games for directed networks [7] , and in the context of social networks, [12] . The latter describes a network formation game in which the link costs are heterogeneous and the benefit depends only on a player's nearest neighbors (i.e., no spillovers).
Most of the studies on the application of game theory to networks, with very few exceptions, e.g., [13] , focused on static properties of the game. This is particularly true for network formation games. However, it is not clear that the Internet has reached an equilibrium. Indeed, ASs continuously draw new contracts, some merge with others while other quit business. In fact, a dynamic inspection of the inter-AS network suggests that the system may be far from equilibrium. Therefore, a dynamic study of an inter-AS network formation game is needed.
In addition, previous work ignores an important requirement that Autonomous Systems has -reliability. Indeed, failures occur, and an AS must face such events. While some game theoretic works addressed reliability in other contexts ( [14] , [15] ), to the best of our knowledge, there are no works that considered the topological properties that emerge in a heterogeneous, dynamic, network formation game with reliability constraints.
We establish an analytically-tractable model, which explicitly accounts for the heterogeneity of players as well as reliability requirements. We base our model on the heralded Fabrikant model [16] , [17] , which was recently extended to include heterogeneous players [18] . Our model shares common setup and dynamics with this recent work [18] . By introducing reliability considerations in the present model and comparing the resulting findings, we explicitly account for the effect of survivability on the network structure.
We model the inter-AS connectivity as a network formation game with heterogeneous players that may share costs by monetary transfers. We account for the inherent bilateral nature of the agreements between players, by noting that the establishment of a link requires the agreement of both nodes at its ends, while removing a link can be done unilaterally. As reliability comes into play, agents may require to be connected to other agents, or to all the other agents in the network, by at least two disjoint paths. We investigate both the static properties of the resulting game as well as its dynamic evolution.
Game theoretic analysis is dominantly employed as a "toy model" for contemplating about real-world phenomena. It is rarely confronted with real-world data. In this study we go a step further from traditional formal analysis, and we do consider real inter-AS topology data analysis to support our theoretical findings.
The main contributions of our study are as follows:
• In the context of network formation games, we provide a theoretical framework that introduces reliability constraints. We discuss both the case of frequent failures, where the fall-back pathways are as frequently used as the main pathways, as well as the case of rare crashes.
• We introduce the concept of "price of reliability", which is defined as the ratio of the social cost with reliability constraints to the social cost with no such additional constraints. Surprisingly, we show that this price can be smaller than one, namely, that the additional reliability requirements may increase the social utility.
• We provide dynamical analysis of topological quantities, and explain the prevalence of some "network motifs", i.e., sub-graphs that appear frequently in the network. Through real-world data, we provide encouraging support to our predictions. In the next section, we describe our model. We discuss alternative variants that address different failure frequencies or whether utility transfers (e.g., monetary transfers) are allowed or not. We address both the case of allowing utility (i.e., monetary) transfers as well as the case where this is not possible. Next, in Section 3, we provide static analysis. Dynamic analysis is presented in Section 4. In section 5 we compare our theoretical predictions with real-world data on inter-AS topologies. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 6. Full proofs and some technical details are omitted from this version and can be found online [19] .
II. MODEL
We assume that each AS is a player. While there are many types of players, following [18] , we aggregate them into two types: major league (or type-A) players, such as major ISPs, central search engines and the likes, and minor league (or type-B) players, such as local ISP or small enterprises. Each player, regardless of its type, may form contracts with other players, and should they reach a mutual understanding, a link between them is formed. A player's strategy is set by specifying which links it is interested in establishing, and, if permissible, the price it will be willing to pay for each. In order to maintain reliable routing pathways, players may be required to sustain at least two disjoint paths to other players or a subset of players.
We denote the set of type-A (type B) player by T A (T B ). A link connecting node i to node j is denoted as either (i, j) or ij. The total number of players is N = |T A | + |T B |, and we assume N ≥ 3. The shortest distance between nodes i and j is the minimal number of hops along a path connecting them and is denoted by d(i, j). Finally, the degree of node i is denoted by deg(i).
A. Basic model
Our cost function is based on the cost structure in [16] and [17] . Players are penalized for their distance from other players. First and foremost, players require a good, fast connection to the major players, while they may relax their connection requirements to minor players. Bandwidth usage and delay depends heavily on the hop distance, and connection quality is represented by this metric. Similarly to [18] , we weight the relative importance of a major player by a factor A > 1 in the cost function in the corresponding distance term. The link prices represent factors such as the link's maintenance costs, bandwidth allocation costs etc. Different player types may incur different link costs, c A , c B , due to varying financial resources or infrastructure.
All ASs must maintain access to the Internet in case of a single link failure. This is tantamount to the requirement that all the players must have at least two link disjoint paths to each other node. Nevertheless, if either link prices are high, crash frequencies are low or the content of a minor AS is of little value, players may relax their reliability requirements and demand the establishment of disjoint paths only to the major players. This is represented in the cost function by a binary parameter τ , which is set to one if two disjoint paths are required to all nodes, and zero if the reliability requirement holds for major players only.
The distance cost is composed of two terms, one represents the distance along the primary path and the other represents the distance along the backup path. The relative weight of these two terms is set by the parameter δ. If failures are often, then the regular and backup paths (in the corresponding pair of link-disjoint paths) are used almost as frequently. As such, they must be weighted the same in the cost function. In this case, the likelihood of using either route is the same, and δ = 1. Conversely, if failures are rare, traffic will be mostly carried across the shorter path. Therefore, its length should carry more weight in the cost than the length of the backup route, hence δ 1. This motivates the following cost function.
Definition 1. The cost function, C(i), of node i of type β ∈ {A, B}, is defined as:
where d(i, j) and d (i, j) are the lengths of a pair of paths between i, j that minimizes the cost function. d(i, j) denotes the length of the shorter path. Formally, denote a pair of disjoint paths connecting player i and player j as
) is the length of shorter (correspondingly, longer) path. Set
For convenience, we set c (c A + c B ) /2. We assume c A ≤ c B . The social cost is the sum of individual costs, S = C β (i). We denote the optimal (minimal) social cost as S optimal , and the social cost at the optimal stable solution is S optimal . The price of stability is the ratio between the social cost at the best stable solution and its value at the optimal solution, namely P oS =S optimal /S optimal . Similarly, denote byS pessimal the highest social cost in an equilibrium. Then, the price of anarchy is the ratio between the social cost at the worst stable solution and its value at the optimal solution, namely P oA =S pessimal /S optimal . Definition 2. We denote the change in cost of player i as after the addition (removal) of a link (j, k) by
If δ = 1, then the two routing pathways are used the same. In this case, the shortest cycle length d(i, j) + d (i, j) is the relevant quantity that appears in the cost function. This can be found in polynomial time by using Suurballe's algorithm ( [20] , [21] ). However, if δ 1, routing will occur along two disjoint paths, such that the length of the shortest between the two is shortest (among all pairs of disjoint paths). Although the complexity of finding this pair is NP-Hard, first finding the shortest path and then finding the next shortest path is a heuristic that works remarkably well, both in the real-world data analysis and on the networks obtained in the theoretical discussion. The reason behind this is that, when failures are rare, information is predominantly routed along the shortest path. When players are required to establish a fall-back route, they will establish a path that is disjoint from the current routing path, namely the shortest one.
The establishment of a link requires the bilateral agreement of the two parties at its ends, while removing a link can be done unilaterally. This is known as a pairwise-stable equilibrium [22] , [13] .
Definition 3. The players' strategies are pairwise-stable if for all i, j ∈ T A ∪ T B , the following hold:
The resulting graph is referred to as a stabilizable graph.
The additional reliability requirements result in additional link expenses, as for example, the degree of every node needs to be at least two. The price of reliability is the ratio between the optimal social cost under the additional survivability constraint to the optimal social cost when the additional constraints are removed. optimal . The price of reliability (PoR) is the ratio between the optimal value of the social costs among the set of corresponding stable equilibria, P oR =S optimal /S (bare)
optimal . Surprisingly, we shall show that there exist scenarios in which reliability requirements increase the social utility, so that the price of reliability can be smaller than one.
B. Utility transfer
Thus far, it was implicitly assumed that utility transfer is not feasible. Nevertheless, often players are able to transfer utility, for example via monetary transactions. An extended model that incorporates such transfers is introduced by allowing for a monetary transaction in which player i pays player j an amount P ij iff the link (i.j) is established [18] . Player j sets some minimal price w ij and should P ij ≥ w ij the link is formed.
Definition 5. The cost function of player i when monetary transfers are allowed isC(i) C(i) + j,ij∈E (P ij − P ji ).
We recall the observation in [18] that, without transfers, a link will be established only if both parties, i and j, reduce their costs, C(i, E + ij) < 0 and C(j, E + ij) < 0. But, when monetary transfers are allowed, an edge will be established if (and only if) the relaxed condition ∆C(i, E +ij)+∆C(i, E + ij) < 0 holds. In game theoretic terms, this condition is equivalent to the requirement that the core of the two players game is non-empty.
Corollary 6. When monetary transfers are allowed, the link
In the remainder of the paper, whenever monetary transfers are feasible, we will state it explicitly, otherwise the basic model (without transfers) is assumed.
III. STATIC ANALYSIS
We shall now analyze the properties of stable equilibria. In particular, we discuss the price of anarchy, which is the ratio between the social cost at the worst stable solution and its value at the optimal solution, and the price of stability, which is the ratio between the social cost at the best stable solution and its value at the optimal solution. We shall further discuss topological properties that emerge from our analysis.
It was shown in [16] that if c < 1 the only stable solution is a clique and in [18] it was shown that if c A < A then the major players form a clique. One may have guessed that reliability requirements, which generally induce the creation of additional, backup edges, would ease the formation of the clique. The next proposition shows that this naive assumption is wrong, and in fact, as the frequency of failure increases, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the major player's clique. Consider a dense set, in which every player may access all the other players within two hops by a at least two disjoint paths. A direct link between two players only reduces their mutual distance by one, and does not affect any other distance. If this link fails often, it may be used only partially, and it may not be worthy to pay its cost. Hence, in this setting, counter intuitively, frequent failures end up with a sparser network. Proof: We consider a major player's clique and ask under which conditions the removal of a link is a worthy move. Consider an edge (i, j) in this clique. Since only the shortest distance between players i and j is affected, and is increased by one, the type-A players clique is stable if and only if A/ (1 + δ) > c A .
In the Internet, the major players (tier-1 AS) form a densely connected set, a clique-like subgraph. Therefore, in the rest of the paper we shall only consider the case where c A < A/2.
The next proposition describes a scenario in which, surprisingly, the additional reliability constraints reduce the social cost.
Proposition 8. Assume 1 < c A < A/2 and symmetric reliability requirements, namely τ = 1. Then, the optimal network is composed of a type-A clique, where all the type B nodes are connected to all members of the type-A clique, as depicted in Fig. 1 . This network is not stabilizable, and P oS > 1. Nevertheless, for |T B | |T A | 1, we have P oS → 1. In addition, the Price of Reliability is smaller than one.
The main idea behind this result is that in the optimal, yet unstable solution, every minor player established a link with all the major players (Fig. 1) . This configuration is unstable as it is over-saturated with links, and the optimal stable solution with survivability considerations is obtained by diluting this network so that every minor player will connect to just two major players. If the reliability requirements are further removed, then the additional dilution occurs, increasing the social cost. In other words, the stable configuration is under-saturated with edges, and the additional survivability requirements facilitate the formation of additional links.
In conclusion, if the failure frequency is high, the survivability requirements will induce dilution of the clique of major players. However, the opposite effect occurs along the graph cut-set between the minor players set and the major players set, where the additional constraints lead to an increased number of links connecting major and minor players.
So far we have assumed that the reliability requirements are symmetric. As explained in the introduction, in some cases it is reasonable to assume that players will require a backup route only to the major players, i.e., non-symmetric reliability constraints. We shall now show that in this case, the social cost may deteriorate considerably. Hence, from a system designer point of view, it is much more important to incentivize a configuration where the reliability requirements are symmetric, than to reduce failure frequency globally. This result stems from the following lemma. A stable equilibrium with infinite social cost can be easily achieved by considering a network where all minor players are connected to a single, designated, major player. There exists a single path of at most two hops between every minor player to every major player. However, as the stability requirements are asymmetric, the major players have no incentive to establish additional routes to any minor player, and the reliability requirements of the minor players remain unsatisfied.
A. Monetary transfers
The previous discussion assumed that a player cannot compensate other players for an increase in their costs. Yet, contracts between ASs often do involve monetary transactions.
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Our first result indicates that, in this setting, in contrast to the previous setting, there always exists a fallback route between every two players, regardless of the symmetric or asymmetric nature of the additional survivability constraints. If monetary transfers are feasible, players may compensate other players for the cost of additional links such that all the additional constraints are satisfied. Hence, symmetry is less important than in the previous scenario. Furthermore, this result suggests that every player is connected to every other player by a cycle. The following proposition shows that the maximal cycle length decays with the number of major players. As the number of ASs increases in time, this predicts that the maximal cycle length should decrease in time. We shall verify this prediction in Section V.
Proposition 11. Assume 1 < c < A/2 . Then, every two players are connected by a cycle, and the maximal cycle length is bounded by
Our second result is based on the first one, and shows that the price of anarchy is bounded. In fact, as the network grows, Proposition 11 also indicates that its diameter shrinks. Therefore, in the large network limit, the price of anarchy is bounded by a constant. 
IV. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
The Internet undergoes continuous transformations, such as the emergence of new ASs, or formation of new traffic contracts. In fact, it may very well be out of equilibrium. Therefore, a static analysis of the equilibrium points must be accompanied by a dynamic analysis. Our main focus in this section is to identify prevalent network motifs [23] , i.e., small sub-graphs that emerge during the natural evolution of the network. In Section V we shall show that these motifs are indeed ubiquitous in the real AS topology, and that the frequency of their occurrences is few folds more than expected in a random network.
While there are many possible equilibria, we shall show that convergence occurs only to just a few. We shall also show that the convergence time is short, namely linear in the number of players.
We start the discussion by setting up the dynamic framework, as first formulated in [18] .
A. Setup & Definitions
We split the game into turns, where at each turn only a single player is allowed to remove or initiate the formation of links. At each point in time, or turn, the players that already joined the game form a subset N ⊂ T A ∪ T B . We shall implicitly assume that the cost function is calculated with respect to the set N of players that are already present in the network. Each turn is divided into moves, at each of which a player either forms or removes a single link. A player's turn is over when it has no incentive to perform additional moves. Note that disconnections of several links can be done unilaterally and hence iteratively. During player's i turn, all the other players will act in a greedy, rather than strategic, manner. For example, although it may be that player j prefers that a link (i, j ) would be established for some j = j, it will accept the establishment of the less favorable link (i, j). In other words, the active player has the advantage of initiation and the other players react to its offers. There are numerous scenarios in which players cannot fully forecast other players' moves and offers, e.g., when information is asymmetric or when only partial information is available [24] . In these settings, it is likely that a greedy strategy will become the modus operandi of many players. This is a prevalent strategy also when the system evolves rapidly and it is difficult to assess the current network state and dynamics. Formally, we express this dynamic rule as follows.
Definition 13. Dynamic Rule #1: Assume it is player i's turn and let the set of links at its mth move be denoted as E m . In player i's mth move, it may remove a link (i, j) ∈ E m or, if player j agrees, it may establish the link (i, j) / ∈ E m . Player j would agree to establish (i, j) iff C(j; E m + (i, j)) − C(j; E m ) < 0.
In a dynamic network formation game, a key question is: Can a player temporarily disconnects itself from the graph, only to reconnect after getting to a better bargaining position? Or must a player stay connected? If the timescale in which the costs are evaluated is comparable to the timescale in which the dynamics occur, then, clearly, a player will not disconnect from the network voluntarily. However, if the latter is much shorter, it may, for a very brief time, disconnect itself from the graph in order to perform some strategic move. If player i cannot temporarily increase its cost, then it will only act such that on each move (rather than on each turn) its cost will reduce. The following rules address the two alternative limits. Definition 14. Dynamic Rule #2a: A link (i, j) will be added if i asks to form this link and C(j; E m + ij) < C(j; E m ). In addition, any link (i, j) can be removed in move m.
Dynamic Rule #2b: In addition to Dynamic Rule #2a, at the end of its move is cost is reduced. Namely, player i may remove a link (i, j) only if C(i; E m − ij) < C(i; E m ) and may establish a link (i, j) if both C(j; E m + ij) < C(j; E m ) and C(i; E m + ij) < C(i; E m ) According to Dynamic Rule #2a, a player is allowed to perform a strategic plan in which the first few steps will increase its cost, as long as when the plan is completed its cost will be reduced. On the other hand, if the game follows the stricter Dynamic Rule #2b, a player's cost must be reduced at each move, hence such multi-move plan is not possible. Figure 2 . A network configuration which includes a "double-star" structure of minor players. Every node in the primary star (encircled in yellow) is linked to a major player, node k (in green). A direct link connects the two star centers, denoted by 1 and 2 (in pink). The members in the secondary star (in purple) are connected to both star centers. In addition, there secondary star center is also connected to the major player k. There might be additional minor players outside the stars (in red). Needless to say, the type-A clique (square boxes) is also present.
B. Basic Model -Results
We first show that during the natural evolution of the network a "double star" sub-graph, or network motif, often emerges. In the "double star" motif, as depicted in Fig. 2 , there exists a primary and a secondary star. All the minor players are connected to the primary star's center. Part of the players are also connected to the other star's center, forming the secondary star. Consider a region where it is immensely difficult to establish a link to a major player, either due to geographical distance, link prices or perhaps additional physical links are simply not accessible. Nevertheless, in order to maintain a reliable connection, there must be at least two links that connect this region to the Internet backbone via some major players. In order to provide a stable, fault tolerant service, every player in this region will form links with the players hosting the endpoints of these links, forming the double star sub-graph. Assume now that link prices reduce over time, or that the importance of a fast connection to the Internet core increases in time. In this case, players may decide to establish direct links with the major players, and remove either one of both links connecting them to the star centers. Note though, that players will be reluctant to disconnect from the star center if the number of nodes in the star is large.
Moreover, the next theorem also shows that, eventually, and fairly quickly, the system will converge to either the optimal stable state, or to a state in which the social cost is a low multiple of the optimal social cost.
Theorem 15. Assume symmetric reliability requirements, i.e., τ = 1. If the players follow Dynamic Rules #1 and #2a, then, in any playing order:
A) The system converges to either the optimal stable state, depicted in Fig. 3 , or to the network depicted in Fig. 2. B) In the large network limit, namely, when |T B | |T A | Figure 3 . The optimal stable network, as described in Theorem 15.
1, the social costs ratio satisfy S/S optimal < 3/2 + , with → 0. C) if players play in a uniformly random order, the probability that the system has not converged by turn t decays exponentially with t. Otherwise, if every player plays at least once in O(N) turns, convergence occurs after O(N) steps.
In section III we emphasized the importance of symmetry in the reliability requirements for reducing the Price of Anarchy. The next theorem affirms this assertion, and shows that if the constraints are asymmetric, the system converges to a state with an unbounded social cost on a large set of possible dynamics and initial conditions. Theorem 16. Assume asymmetric reliability requirements, namely τ = 0. If the players follow Dynamic Rules #1 and either Dynamic Rule #2a or #2b, then the system converges to a state with an unbounded social cost.
C. Monetary Transfers
Recall that under the presence of monetary transfers, players i and j will agree to establish an edge if ∆C(j, E + ij) + ∆C(i, E + ij) < 0. Nevertheless, it may be that during the active player's turn there are a few links that satisfy this condition, and the player must prioritize them. Each player's decision is myopic, and is based solely on the current state of the network. Hence, the order of establishing links is potentially important. Needless to say, a player's preference order will depend on the link prices. While there are several alternatives, we adopt the following preference order [18] .
Denote the active player as player i. Each link (i, j) carries different utility in player i's respect. It is reasonable that a link with a lower "connection value" will be priced lower. Therefore, the link with the least connection utility will be marked with the lowest price, and in fact, one may assume its price will be as low as the implied cost of the other party in this link. We denote this price as P * . Every other player j will use P * as a baseline and place a higher price tag for the link (i, j), as it is more beneficial for player i. Formally: Definition 17. "Strategic" Pricing mechanism: Set j * as the node that maximizes ∆C(i, E + ij * ). Set P * = max{−∆C(j * , E + ij * ), 0}. Denote the excess utility of the link (i, j) as α ij = ∆C(i, E + ij) − (∆C(i, E + ij * ) + P * ) . The price player j requires in order to establish (i, j) is P ij = max{0, α ij , −∆C(j, E + ij)}. . The "entangled cycles" motif. a) Six minor player are connected in an "entangled cycles" subgraph. The first two nodes have direct connection to some major player, and access the rest of the network by the major player's additional links, represented by the dotted line. b) If at some point, a link between a player in this subgraph and some external player is formed (in this example, a major player), some links may be removed without violating the reliability requirement and without increasing the distance cost appreciably. The removed links marked by a red X.
Under this pricing mechanism, there could be many links that carry the same utility. Some of these links have a better connection value, but they come at a higher price. Since all the links carry the same utility, we need to decide on some preference mechanism for player i. The simplest one is the "cheap" choice, in which, if there are a few equivalent links, the player will choose the cheapest one. This can be a reasonable choice, as new players cannot spend too much resources, and therefore they will choose the "cheapest" option that belongs to the set of links with maximal utility.
Definition 18. Preference order: Player i will establish links with player j if player j minimizes ∆C(i, E + ij) + P ij and ∆C(i, E + ij) + P ij < 0. If there are several players that minimize ∆C(i, E + ij) + P ij , then player i will establish a link with a player that minimizes P ij amongst them. If there are several players that satisfy the previous condition, then one out of them is chosen randomly.
We are now at a position to identify an additional network motif, namely, the "entangled cycles". This network motif is composed of a line (i.e., interconnected sequence) of minor players' nodes, with some cross-links between the nodes along this line, breaking the hierarchy (Fig. 4) . The "entangled cycle" of length three is the "feedback loop" motif, which was previously found to exist in a higher frequency than expected in the Internet graph [23] .
When a new minor player arrives, it will choose the two cheapest links and will connect to the corresponding players. Clearly, its costs due to the distance from the rest of the network will be the highest. As such, when the next player arrives, it will offer the lowest link price. The new arrival will link to it and to one of its providers. The process will repeat, until, at some point, an existing player will decide that this growing branch is too far from it, and will connect to one of the nodes along this "entangled cycles". At this point, this subgraph will be over-saturated with links as players may utilize this link to access the Internet core. Hence, some links will be removed (see, for example Fig. 4(b) ). The set of the links that will be removed depends heavily on the playing order and the temporary network structure. Nevertheless, some cross-links may remain in order to satisfy reliability constrains. 
Assume that a subset W of minor player first join the game and play consecutively and that the two players with the maximal distance cost are adjacent. Then: A) These players will form an "entangled cycles" structure of length l, as depicted in Fig. 4 , and
B) The "entangled cycles" structure is semi-stable, in the following sense: If, at some later turn, there exist players j / ∈ W , i ∈ W such that the link (i, j) is formed (Fig. 4(b) ), then some links in the "entangled cycles" structure may be removed in subsequent turns.
This theorem shows that reliability is a major factor in breaking up tree hierarchy in the Internet. In addition, it also hints that the hierarchical structure does not break frequently in the top levels of the Internet, but rather mostly in the intermediate and lower tiers. Note that according to Theorem 19(B) , in large networks the length of the "entangled motifs" is short. Therefore, we do not expect to see excessively long structures, but rather small ones, having just a few ASs.
V. DATA ANALYSIS
In this section we compare our theoretical predictions with the real-world inter-AS topology graph [25] . We classified ASs to major players and minor players according the popular CAIDA ranking [26] . For the sake of comparison with previous work [18] , we classified the major players as the top 100 ASs according to this ranking.
In Section III-A, we showed that, by allowing monetary transfers, the maximal cycle length connecting a major player to a minor player depends inversely on the number of major players. As the number of ASs increases in time, it is reasonable that the number of major players grows as well. Hence, we expect that the length of the shortest cycle connecting a major player to a minor player will decrease in time. Fig. 5 shows the mean cycle length connecting one of the secondary leading 2000 ASs, ranked 101-2100 in CAIDA ranking, and one of the top 100 nodes. The steady decline of the cycle's length in time is predicted by our model.
Our analysis showed that in most of the generated topologies, the minor players are organized in small subgraphs that have direct connection to the Internet core, namely the major players clique, or the tier-1 subgraph, in agreement with [18] . In order to maintain a reliable connection, in each subgraph there must be at least two links that connect minor players to the core. Indeed, we have found out that the ratio between the mean number of disjoint paths from a minor player to the core and the mean degree of minor players is more than 0.95, and it increases in time (Fig. 6) . That is, almost every outgoing link of a minor player is used to provide it with an additional, disjoint path to the core. In other words, a player is more likely to establish an additional link, hence increase its degree, if it supplies it with a new path to the core that does not intersect its current paths.
In section IV we predicted the ubiquity of two network motifs, the "double star" motif ( Fig. 2) and the "entangled cycles" motif (Fig. 4) . We define the occurrence of a "double star" motif as the existence of a connected pair of nodes, each with degree greater than m, designated as the centers, such that at least m neighbors of one center are also neighbors of the other center. We generated random networks according to the Configuration Model (CM), in which each node is given a number of stubs according to its degree, and stubs are connected uniformly. Then, we evaluated the mean number of occurrences of this motif in a random CM network with the same number of nodes and the same degree distribution as the real inter-AS topology. For m = 2, we have found 28.8K occurrences in the real-world inter-AS topology, whereas the mean number of occurrences in the random CM network was only 5.8K ± 1.3K instances (the ± indicates standard deviation). Namely, there are more than four times displays of this subgraph in the Internet than in a random network with the same degree distribution. Chebyshev's inequality provides a bound on the p-value, p < 0.003. This low value indicates that it is highly unlikely that a random CM network explains the frequent appearance of this network motif. We have tested the prevalence of this motif with other values of m and the number of occurrences is consistently a few times more than expected in a random CM network. Our analysis suggests that reliability considerations is one of the factors leading to the increased number of incidents. The unexpected prevalence of the "feedback loop", which is a special case of the "entangled cycles" motif, was first reported in [23] . The "feedback loop" motif coincides with the "entangled cycles" motif of length three. In order to further assess our results we tested for the occurrence frequency of the "entangled cycles" motif of length four. We compared the number of occurrences of this motif in the real-world Internet graph to the expected number of occurrences in a random Configuration Model network. While the number of instances of this motif in the Internet graph was 27.7M , the expected number of occurrences in the random network was only 1.3M ± 0.8M . The abundance of this network motif, an order of magnitude greater than expected (p < 0.001, a relaxed bound based on Chebyshev's inequality) provides a positive indication to the implications of survivability requirements.
In summary, we have provided both static and dynamic empirical evidence that conform with our predictions, suggesting the importance of reliability considerations on the structure and dynamics of the inter-AS topology.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
While many studies have tried to model the Internet structure, the list of works that explicitly address reliability considerations is much shorter. Furthermore, most models of the Internet structure and dynamics assume homogenous agents, while the Internet is inherently heterogeneous, composed of a wide variety of entities with different business models. In this work, we found that constructing a model that includes these two factors, namely reliability and heterogeneity, may provide important insights on the Internet structure and dynamics.
We first rigorously formulated a model of a network formation game in this context. Our model is flexible, and may be used in a wide variety of settings. It allows for many variations and schemes, for example situations in which failures are frequent or rare, or to account for varying centrality of different types of players. The inherent heterogeneity in the model also allows us to describe scenarios in which a fallback route is required only to a subset of players. Indeed, a reasonable AS policy is to require a backup routing path only to the Internet backbone, rather than establishing fault-tolerant routing pathways to every particular Autonomous System.
We established the Price of Reliability, which measures the excess social cost that is required in order to maintain network survivability in an optimal stable equilibrium. Surprisingly, we showed that it can be smaller than one, that is, the additional survivability constraints add to the social utility. We have also showed that reliability requirements have disparate effects on different parts of the network. While it may support dilution in dense areas, it facilitates edges formation in sparse areas, and in particular it supports the formation of edges connecting minor players and major players.
In our dynamic analysis we have found the repetitive appearance of small sub-graphs, or network motifs, namely the "entangled cycles" motif and the "double star" motif. Indeed, the number of appearance of these motifs in the real Inter-AS topology surpassed the expected number by a few times, indicating that additional factors support their formation, and as our analysis shows, survivability is one of them. We have also predicted that the length of the minimal cycle connecting a major player to a minor player should decrease in time. This prediction, too, was verified by a dynamic data analysis.
Finally, while our analysis focuses on the inter-AS topology, it may be applied to other networks as well, that are composed of heterogeneous, rational agents that are required to maintain some reliability aspects. Primary examples are trade networks and MVNO operators in the cellular market.
In this work we have shown that a game theoretic analysis of network formation, which encompasses heterogeneous agents and explicitly addresses survivability concerns, holds promising results. Nevertheless, many questions are left open. How does the emerging network handle more than a single failure? Which incentive mechanism will promote increased reliability of the future Internet? What can a comparative analysis of experimental results on different networks tell us about the players' strategies in each network? Furthermore, our analysis considered the cases of very frequent and extermely rare failures. How does an intermediate rate of failures affect the network structure? What changes are introduced due to peering agreements? These, and many more, indicate that there is yet a lot to uncover in this intersection between network formation, heterogeneity and reliability.
